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States experience difficulties in realizing the return of rejected asylum seekers, but migration con-
trol policies are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Against this background, we consider expla-
nations for the increase in Assisted Voluntary Return from the Netherlands in the 2005–2011
period. Both macro‐level factors (source country societal conditions and characteristics of the
Dutch “deportation regime”) and individual‐level factors (applicants’ demographic characteristics
and variation in status determination time) are examined. The study, which is based on a unique
multilevel dataset (N = 15,682) with data from governmental and other sources (including Inter-
national Organisation for Migration), is the first to quantitatively test assumed Assisted Voluntary
Return determinants and contributes to the study of policy effects in migration studies. We find
that states are capable of increasing return rates by expanding the use of “hard” and “soft” power.
We propose the term “soft deportation” as a way to go beyond the dichotomy of “voluntary” and
“forced” return.
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Rejected asylum seekers are normally asked to return to their country
of citizenship, and their repatriation is an issue of significant concern in
the industrialized world (Noll, 1999). In the European context, ‘volun-
tary return’ is preferred over ‘forced return’ and rejected asylum
seekers are, in principle, first given the opportunity to organize their
departure themselves, usually assisted by the International Organisa-
tion for Migration (IOM) (Baldaccini, 2009). In the case of Assisted
Voluntary Return (AVR), the IOM pays the travel expenses and pro-
vides financial and/or other support. Rejected asylum seekers who
do not leave are generally considered illegal aliens at some point,
meaning that they become “deportable”, and may be apprehended
with a view to deportation
Countries experience difficulties in realizing the repatriation of
rejected asylum seekers (Black et al., 2004; Ellermann, 2008; Noll,
1999; Leerkes & Broeders, 2010), and the Netherlands is no exception.
For example, out of all those who applied for asylum in 2001 and no
longer had legal stay in 2007, only 20% had ‘demonstrably’ left thewileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/country by 2007, that is, had left via AVR or deportation (INDIAC,
2007). The remaining 80% stayed illegally, or left without IOM involve-
ment. The state does not register “non‐assisted” departure, but the
number of people leaving in this fashion seems to be limited. Informa-
tion from a 2007 Amnesty program suggests that in the early 2000s,
the average annual unregistered departure rate—including onward
(illegal) migration to other European countries—was about 5% to
10%.1 Unregistered departure may have decreased since then, as it
has become more difficult for rejected asylum seekers to go to a differ-
ent European country.2
There is disagreement in migration studies regarding the effective-
ness of migration control (cf. Czaika & De Haas, 2013; Lahav &
Guiraudon, 2006). A considerable body of research highlights limits
to migration control. For example, Czaika and De Haas (2013: 497)
point at “efficacy gaps”, when “[p]olicy efficacy is constrained because
migration is driven by structural determinants in origin and destination
countries [and] internal dynamics of migration networks and systems.”
Other researchers argue that policies are becoming increasingly
sophisticated. An example is Gibney’s analysis of what he calls theCopyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.psp 1
2 LEERKES ET AL.“deportation turn”—the increased use of deportation in many western
countries as a way of dealing with rejected asylum seekers and (other)
deportable migrants: “states are adaptive agents, often able to modify
their behavior to respond effectively to challenges to the exercise of
border control” (Gibney, 2008: 152). While his analysis focuses on
the ability of governments to partially overcome the limits of
deportation as an instrument of migration control, Gibney (2008:
165) also discusses the increased efforts by states to realize “nominally
voluntary return”.
Dutch figures for the period 2005–2011 show a marked increase in
deportees and those leaving by way of AVR (Leerkes, Boersema,
Galloway, van Os, & van Londen, 2014). Of all asylum seekers rejected
in 2005 not obtaining a residence permit at a later stage, 5.3% made
use of AVR in the calendar year of rejection or the one after, and 0.9%
was deported. By 2011, the cumulative “demonstrable” departure rate
was 12.5%. Five cohorts later, among all asylum seekers rejected in
2010, 18.3% had alreadymade use of AVR by 2011, and 20.5% had been
deported.3 These figures raise the question of whether Gibney’s “depor-
tation turn” also manifests itself in AVR, and, if so, whether the AVR
increases are mostly a by‐product of rising deportation rates—which
may make migrants prefer AVR over being deported—, or whether other
policy mechanisms, which are more specific to AVR, were responsible.
It is against this background that we ask:What explains the increase
in AVR in the period 2005–2011 among 6‐year cohorts of asylum seekers
rejected in the Netherlands in the period 2005–2010? This question is
answered using a multilevel dataset with information on (i) Dutch
admission and return policies; (ii) source country political and economic
conditions; and (iii) asylum seekers’ demographic characteristics (age,
sex, and family status). The influence of policy factors are estimated,
while controlling the effects of two non‐policy factors that are gener-
ally seen as primarily determining return migration, namely source
country societal conditions and migrants’ social attachments.
Our interest is in understanding return migration among rejected
asylum seekers, and we treat AVR as an indicator of return migration.
It should nonetheless be kept in mind that ‘non‐assisted’ (unregistered)
return also occurs, and that return may be another step in a complex
chain of mobilities (cf. King & Christou, 2011). While the opportunities
for remigration to the Global North seem to be limited for rejected
asylum seekers (cf. Van Houte, Siegel, & Davids, 2015), repatriation
does not preclude the possibility of continued migration, especially
domestically or regionally.
By estimating the effects of non‐policy and policy factors on AVR
—regardless of whether these explain the increase in AVR—the analysis
also adds to the literature on the determinants of return among
rejected asylum seekers. To our knowledge, there are no quantitative
studies testing these determinants. The few existing quantitative stud-
ies are descriptive (e.g., IOM, 2010), and the insights of qualitative
studies (e.g., Black et al., 2004; Kromhout, 2009; Van Houte et al.,
2015; Zimmermann, 2010) have never been combined and tested in
a multivariate model. There also is a larger literature on return among
labor migrants, family migrants, and asylum permit holders migrants
(for instance Constant & Massey, 2002; De Haas & Fokkema, 2011;
De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2014; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007; Jensen
& Pedersen, 2007; Klinthäll, 2007), but it is unclear whether its findings
can be generalized to rejected asylum seekers, whose return decisionsoccur in the context of a significant involvement of governments to
realize the return (while restricting remigration). Additionally, the
return decisions may depend more on source country political condi-
tions, especially in comparison with labor and family migrants.
The analysis also contributes to the understanding of policy effects
in migration studies. While international migration is heavily regulated,
there is still a tendency in migration studies, especially in quantitative
work, to explain international migration in more or less the same way
as domestic migration (e.g., see migration as the outcome of wage
differentials, social ties, and so forth). It is increasingly recognized that
more attention needs to be given to the role of immigration policy.
For example, Massey (2015) set out to develop a “theory of the state”,
which argues that states mediate the effects of non‐policy determi-
nants of migration; policies typically becomemore restrictive, for exam-
ple, in periods of economic contraction. What interests us here are the
causal mechanisms (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010) via which laws and
policies, once implemented, codetermine migration patterns. Focusing
on AVR among rejected asylum seekers, we aim to contribute to the
understanding of various policy mechanisms, the relevance of which
is not limited to AVR (coercion, deterrence, facilitation, rewarding, and
perceived legitimacy). The latter mechanism in particular has largely
been overlooked in the migration literature (but see Ryo, 2013;
Van Alphen, Molleman, Leerkes, & van den Hoek, 2013).
Finally, we aim to contribute to the discussion on terminology.
Scholars have criticized the term ‘voluntary return’ when it character-
izes the return of individuals who are unlikely to have returned had
they been offered a residence permit (Blitz, Sales, & Marzano, 2005;
Webber, 2011), but no real alternatives have been proposed. We
propose the term “soft deportation” as a conceptual tool to transcend
the administrative dichotomy of “voluntary” and “forced” return.2 | NON‐POLICY AND POLICY
DETERMINANTS OF AVR
2.1 | Non‐policy factors
Return migration is partially driven by source country societal condi-
tions, including changes in these conditions. Dustmann and Weiss
(2007), for example, show that return rates are lower among migrants
originating from poorer countries than among those originating from
richer countries. For asylum migrants, economic factors are assumed
to be less important than political factors (Black et al., 2004; King,
2000; Van Wijk, 2008), but asylum migrants certainly also have socio‐
economic reintegration concerns (Klinthäll, 2007; Zimmermann, 2010).
Return migration is also determined by social attachments. Formal
education in the source country, for instance, is generally associated
with higher return rates (Constant & Massey, 2002; Dustmann &
Weiss, 2007; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007; Klinthäll, 2007). Likewise,
return becomes more likely when migrants were employed in their
country of origin and/or have ties with partners and children who live
there (Constant & Massey, 2002). It can therefore be expected that
AVR is relatively likely among older asylum applicants; source country
attachments typically increase with migration age, as individuals have
had more time to build up such attachments (Dustmann, Bentolila, &
LEERKES ET AL. 3Faini, 1996; Snel, Engbersen & Leerkes, 2016). Such an age effect is
unlikely to be linear: after a certain age, persons become less able‐bod-
ied and mobile.
Asylum country attachments can be expected to have a less
unequivocal influence. Sociocultural integration is generally found to
have a negative effect on return intentions (De Haas & Fokkema,
2011; De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2014). Those who have accultur-
ated to the immigration country may experience return as particularly
stressful (Tannenbaum, 2007), and immigrants who identify strongly
with the immigration country, and feel at home there, are less inclined
to return (Constant & Massey, 2002). We therefore expect that asylum
seekers with children, especially of school age, are relatively unlikely to
leave by way of AVR. At school, children learn more about the asylum
country and its language, and school‐age children spend more time
with peers and teachers than with their parents (Kalverboer & Zijlstra,
2006). Economic integration has a more ambiguous and sometimes
positive effect on return (De Haas & Fokkema, 2011; De Vroome &
Van Tubergen, 2014). However, its effects lie outside the scope of
the present study, as there is little variation in economic integration
during the asylum procedure (labor market access is restricted).
Migrants also have attachments to immigrant networks in the asylum
country, often consisting of (former) compatriots. Ethnic incorporation is
especially relevant for individuals lacking legal residence, as it increases
the “opportunity structure of illegal residence” (cf. Engbersen, Van San
& Leerkes, 2006; Leerkes, Engbersen & Van San, 2007): opportunities
to find accommodation, informal work, financial support, and potential
future spouses able to sponsor family reunification applications. It also
reduces apprehension risks (Leerkes, Varsanyi & Engbersen, 2012).
Asylum migration is generally initiated by men. Often, women
apply for asylum once their partners have settled to some degree
(Mascini & Van Bochove, 2009). It can therefore be expected that
AVR use among unaccompanied men is more prevalent than among
men accompanied by their families. Unaccompanied men, especially
if married, will have stronger source country attachments than men
in families, and there will also be stronger “settlement intentions” once
women and children have migrated. For women, this effect will be less
pronounced, for example because unaccompanied women may have
fled gender‐based family violence (cf. Randall, 2002).2.2 | The Dutch “deportation regime”
Policy factors co‐determine migration. Here, we are primarily inter-
ested in how AVR—within given legal constructions of certain catego-
ries of migrants as “deportable”—is produced by “deportation regimes”,
a term that we borrow from De Genova (2010), but choose to use in
the plural and define more narrowly as: systems of organizing the
departure of foreigners from a state’s territory who do not, or no
longer, have a legal stay there, or are about to lose that right.4
Deportation regimes, so defined, have two main dimensions: (1) the
infrastructure that states have developed to apprehend and deport
migrants who have become deportable and (2) the infrastructure that
states have developed—either directly or more indirectly—to seduce,
press or convince individuals who are (expected to become) deportable
into leaving themselves. The IOM is an intergovernmental organiza-
tion, and its involvement in the return of rejected asylum seekers canbe conceptualized as a form of “remote control” through which
(western) governments involve inter‐state and non‐state actors, such
as airline carriers and employers, in migration control (cf. Lahav &
Guiraudon, 2006). We do not take a position as to whether it is good
or bad that part of the IOM’s activities are an element of deportation
regimes so defined.
In order to understand policy effects, it is useful to make a
distinction between instrumental and normative models of compliance
(Tyler, 2003; Scott, 2008), and, relatedly, between hard power and soft
power (Nye, 2004).
Instrumental models explain (non) compliance as arising from self‐
interested calculation: due to certain policy interventions, the attrac-
tiveness of the proscribed behavior (here: overstaying the “departure
term”) may or may not become lower than that of an alternative course
of action (here: return migration). Instrumental models typically distin-
guish between “positive” and “negative” mechanisms. In the case of
AVR, positive mechanisms include facilitation, that is, the lowering of
costs, such as travel costs, and rewarding, that is, increasing the bene-
fits of “desirable” behavior, such as handing over reintegration assis-
tance after returnees have returned. The main negative policy
mechanism is deterrence, that is, attempts to increase the costs of
“undesirable” behavior (here: overstaying the departure term), for
example by reducing rejected asylum seekers’ access to labor markets
and accommodation, or by increasing deportation risks. Deportation in
particular, also requires some degree of force, the ability to obtain an
outcome (deportation) without having to rely on the compliance on
the part of the subject.
While asylum migrants do not seem to consider financial support
an important factor in return decisions (Black et al., 2004), one poten-
tially underestimates how states affect AVR by exclusively focusing on
positive “instrumental” mechanisms. Based on interviews with IOM
employees and an assessment of their client files, VanWijk (2008) con-
cludes that it is not unusual for returnees to feel pressured into AVR
due to financial problems, unemployment, labor inspections, and a
desire to evade immigration detention.
Normative models maintain that rules are followed because peo-
ple believe that doing so is right or “normal” (compare Andrijasevic
and Walters (2010) on the “normalisation of return”). A distinction is
usually made between the normative evaluation of outcomes and pro-
cedures. Outcome legitimacy means that a rule’s content is considered
fair or, as neo‐institutionalists emphasize (Scott, 2008), simply as “nor-
mal”, that is, “as the way we do these things”. This would mean, for
instance, that applicants from relatively safe and free countries choose
to return because they recognize that their asylum cases were weak,
and that they believe that states have a right to deny a residence per-
mit in such cases. Procedural legitimacy means that rules are enforced
in ways that are perceived as just, by actors who are trusted and con-
sidered legitimate. Certain procedural aspects of perceived legitimacy
are primarily related to how migration admission rules are applied,
and we pay attention to one aspect here: the extent to which the asy-
lum decision is likely to be perceived as having been reached carefully
after “due process” and after a “fair” amount of time has been spent to
assess the claim. In a previous study, we found that the percentage of
asylum seekers appealing a negative decision was about 20% points
lower among those rejected between 2 weeks and 3 months than
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(Leerkes et al., 2014). For this reason, we expect a non‐linear relation-
ship between status determination time and AVR, with lower probabil-
ities of AVR in case of both “quick” and “slow” negative first instance
decisions. Other procedural aspects primarily pertain to the return pro-
cess. For example, in 2005, the United Kingdom (UK) government
began allocating case‐workers to asylum seekers who follow the asy-
lum case from beginning to end and are to build up a relationship with
them. Gibney (2008: 166) hypothesizes that such relationships poten-
tially “generate[s] in the asylum seeker a feeling of obligation to return
home if his or her claim is deemed unfounded.”
Nye (2004: 256) has coined the term soft power, which he defines
as “the ability to get what you want through [normative] attraction
rather than coercion or payments”. In Nye’s view, coercion (i.e., force
and deterrence) and payments (i.e., facilitation and rewarding) consti-
tute hard power, while he classifies the normative, more indirect mech-
anisms of compliance as soft power: “When our policies are seen as
legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced” (ibid).
We adopt the idea that harder and softer forms of power exist, but
believe it is more appropriate to conceptualize them as lying on a
hard‐to‐soft continuum going from force, deterrence, facilitation/
rewarding, to perceived legitimacy. Deterrence constitutes a harder
form of power than payments, as the latter typically leave the subject
more choice to comply or resist. While the first dimension of deporta-
tion regimes, as defined in the above, puts the emphasis on hard(er)
forms of power, the second dimension puts more emphasis on soft(er)
forms of power, with the hard(er) forms of power operating in the
background.
Three changes in the Dutch deportation regime seem to represent
an expansion of hard or soft power, and therefore potentially caused
the AVR increase. First, the Netherlands invested considerably in its
forced return policy, although this initially was met with little success
(Leerkes & Broeders, 2010). Immigration detention capacity was
increased and in 2007, the “Repatriation and Departure Service”
(DT&V) was founded, which became responsible for coordinating the
departure of rejected asylum seekers and (other) deportable migrants.
It encourages AVR but is especially active in deportation. Deportation
rates have indeed gone up after 2007.
Second, the IOM expanded its Randstad Return Programme. Under
this program, financed by the Dutch state since 2003, “native counsel-
lors”—IOM employees originating from relevant migrant groups and
speaking their language—approach potential returnees living irregularly
in the country’s largest cities (or are still in asylum seeker centers), and
provide information about return programs. The idea behind the
program is that migrants are less likely to trust regular Dutch function-
aries than functionaries originating from their own country, whom they
can meet with repeatedly in an informal setting. By 2010, there were
eight counselors. Increased native counselor availability can be
expected to have promoted AVR, as it will have increased the
perceived procedural legitimacy of the immigration regime. Procedural
legitimacy is known to be closely related to trust (see Tyler, 2003).
Third, in the period 2001–2004, reintegration assistance for
(rejected) asylum seekers was raised through the “Return and
Reintegration Regulation”. For example, a couple with two children ini-
tially entitled to ƒ2150 (€977) and travel costs became entitled tobetween €5740 and €6460 and travel costs (depending on certain
conditions such as whether the departure occurs within the stipulated
departure term).5 In 2004, it became available to all asylum seekers
with the exception of those originating from European Union (EU)
member states and other Western countries. Beyond its instrumental
effects, increasing reintegration assistance may also have added to
perceived procedural legitimacy.3 | DATA AND METHOD
3.1 | Data
The Immigration and Naturalisation Service provided individual‐level
data on all asylum decisions in the 2005–2011 period, including deci-
sions on appeals and repeat applications. Using “foreigner numbers”,
this information was linked to individual‐level information on deporta-
tion (by the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and DT&V) and
AVR (by the IOM). The resulting dataset was enriched by adding data
at the “country‐cohort” level (examples of country cohorts are “China
2005”, “China 2006”, and “Zimbabwe 2008”), measuring civil freedom,
political terror, and standard of living in asylum seekers’ countries of
citizenship, and characteristics of the Dutch deportation regime (such
as whether or not a native counselor was available for the China
2005 cohort).
Not all observations were used. First, we only included individuals
who submitted a first application in the years 2005 up to and including
2010. Second, citizens from countries that were or became EU mem-
ber states in the 2005–2011 period were excluded. Third, those
initially rejected who obtained an asylum residence permit at a later
stage were filtered out. Fourth, we excluded minors, as we were inter-
ested in decision makers. Fifth, if the asylum case involved several
adults (those who applied with direct family members could be linked),
one adult was randomly selected to remove clustering of observations
at the household level (individuals in couples or families will usually not
decide on AVR independently from each other). Finally, all cases
containing missing values were deleted. Eventually, 15,682 individuals
remained.63.2 | Dependent and independent variables
The dependent variable—hereafter: “AVR use”—was dichotomous and
indicated whether (1) a person returned with help from IOM in the
year he/she was rejected, or the subsequent calendar year or (0) did
not return via the IOM in that time span. Some returnees may also
have been assisted by nongovernmental organizations, but those
who had their travel expenses paid for and used financial reintegration
assistance were still registered by IOM (such assistance is exclusively
provided by IOM Netherlands). We took the rejection in the first
instance, recognizing that those appealing such a rejection may usually
await the outcome in the country of asylum: the decision to appeal is
not fundamentally different from persons ending up in the 0‐category
due to overstaying the 28‐days departure term, or to illegal migration
to a European country. We also ran models predicting AVR use in
the year of rejection or the next two calendar years, thereby “losing”
the 2010 cohort, yielding similar results (not reported).
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structure: individuals are nested in country cohorts, which are nested
in countries (“China 2005” and “China 2006”, for example, are both,
nested in “China”). The 15,682 individuals were nested in 448 country
cohorts and 102 different countries.
For all independent variables, the values pertain to the rejection
year. The level of civil freedom is by Freedom House, which scores
countries annually on their “political rights” and “civil rights” on two
7‐point scales, where 1 represents the highest and 7 the lowest level
of freedom (i.e., the highest level of “unfreedom”). Political terror was
measured using the terror scale by Amnesty International and the
United States (US). Department of State, which is coded from 1 (lowest
level of political violence and terror) to 5 (highest level). We averaged
the figures by Amnesty and the Department of State. As the two Free-
dom House scales were strongly correlated (r = 0.84), and also corre-
lated strongly with political terror (r = 0.57), we summed political
rights, civil rights and political terror and then deducted 3, in order to
obtain a single scale ranging from 0 to 16. We measured the change
in political unfreedom and terror by subtracting the scores for year t‐1
from the score for year t. Measured changes correspond with mean-
ingful political developments.7 Next, standard of living was
operationalized as the Gross Domestic Product at purchasing power
parity (GDP PPP) per capita, by the World Bank. The variable was
skewed to the left (many source countries are quite poor, and there
are a few richer countries). The natural logarithm was used, because
it resulted in a better model fit and because diminishing returns to liv-
ing standard can be expected. GDP growth indicated changes in living
standard. Ethnic incorporation potential is the number of first‐genera-
tion immigrants born in country x who were legally present in the
Netherlands for at least 2 years in year t, divided by the number of asy-
lum seekers with nationality xwho were rejected in year t. The variable
was highly skewed, and the natural logarithm was taken, because it led
to a better model fit and because diminishing returns to incorporation
potential can be expected.
Four “policy variables” were measured at the country‐cohort level.
First, all individuals with native counselor access received a ‘1’ on the
dummy native counselor.8 Second, deportation risk was defined as the
percentage of persons with nationality x rejected in year t and
deported in t or t + 1 (numerator), divided by all persons with national-
ity x rejected in year t not returning via AVR in t or t + 1 (denominator).
Third, as an indirect measure on financial assistance, we calculated a
dummy indicating whether or not the asylum seeker was from Mace-
donia, Belarus, or Georgia. As was explained in Section 2, the IOM
began providing additional financial support in 2004. Given this timing,
it was impossible to test whether additional support caused the AVR
increase, as rejected asylum seekers from all major source countries
qualified. However, the Dutch state began to suspect that part of the
increase was due to nationals from certain Eastern European
countries—from where it is relatively easy to reach Western Europe
(as from 2010, Macedonians no longer require a visa to enter
the Schengen area)—applying for asylum in order to profit from the
increased assistance. Because of these suspicions, three nationalities
were excluded from the Return and Reintegration Regulation program
in 2010 (Georgia andMacedonia) and 2011 (Belarus). We attempted to
“test” this by investigating whether the AVR increase was due to apeak in Macedonians, Georgians, and Belarussians. Fourth, we mea-
sured the country‐specific real value of financial return assistance,
operationalized as the multiplicative inverse of the World Bank’s
“purchasing power conversion factor” (indicating a country’s price
level compared with the concurrent U.S. price level), divided by the
average US$ to € exchange rate in that year (return assistance is in
Euros). It indicates how much more (or less) could be bought with
reintegration assistance in the asylum seeker’s source country com-
pared with what it could buy in the US.9 For example, a value of 4
indicates that it would buy four times more goods and services there
than in the US. This measure takes into account that the real
value of return assistance varies by country and year: nominally,
financial reintegration assistance is the same for all countries, and
is not indexed.
Because of the mostly administrative nature of the data, theoreti-
cal concepts varying at the individual‐level (social attachments and
perceived procedural legitimacy of the first instance rejection) had to
be measured indirectly. The following variables were used: age, family
status, and status determination time. Family status is a nominal variable,
coded from a higher expected AVR probability because of relatively
strong source country attachments to a lower expected AVR probabil-
ity because of weaker source country and stronger asylum country
attachments: (1) unaccompanied man, (2) applicant in a childless cou-
ple, (3) unaccompanied woman (4) applicant accompanied by one or
more child(ren) who are not of school age, (5) applicant accompanied
by at least one school‐age child. Children between 4 and 16 years of
age at the time of the rejection were defined as being of school age.
Status determination time is the number of months between the asylum
application date and the first instance rejection date.
We experimented with the variable “geographical distance to the
Netherlands”, but eventually dropped it. It did not have a
significant effect, and its theoretical rationale is not unequivocal.10
Unemployment data could not be used because there were missing
values for too many countries.3.3 | Method
Using Stata, we estimated (random intercept) hierarchical logistical
regression models with three levels. Multilevel regression was
employed to address clustering of observations at the country cohort
(null model ICC: 0.10) and country level (ICC: 0.18). We do not find evi-
dence for multicollinearity.11
We first estimated models predicting AVR use regardless of
whether the rejected asylum seeker was deported (meaning that those
deported in the year of rejection or the subsequent year were included
in the 0‐category). However, in order to estimate the effects of depor-
tation risk, it was necessary to run comparable models while excluding
all individuals who were deported in the year of rejection or the subse-
quent year.12 The latter models only pertain to larger country‐cohorts
(N > 50)—involving 10,391 individuals, 81 country cohorts and 24
countries—as the reliability of the deportation risk measure is low for
smaller cohorts.
We first estimated models only including dummy variables indicat-
ing the cohort (year of rejection). Subsequently, it was examined how
the coefficients of these dummies changed when assumed AVR
6 LEERKES ET AL.determinants were added. Coefficients that are both X‐ and Y‐stan-
dardized were calculated in order to better compare effect sizes of var-
iables within and between logistic regression models (cf. Mood, 2010).4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Descriptives
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics. It shows that the AVR increase
mainly occurred amongst the cohorts following the 2007 cohort.
Rejected asylum seekers were, on average, required to return to coun-
tries with political unfreedom and terror levels between 9.9 (2010) and
11.8 (2008; the Netherlands scored 0), and where GDP PPP per capita
was, on average, in the $4000 to $5000 range (about eight times lower
than in the Netherlands). Unfreedom and terror vary from cohort to
cohort, but GDP per capita shows an upward trend. On average, those
included in the dataset were about 30 years old, and over three fourths
were unaccompanied men. The number of persons applying for asylum
with children fluctuated, but remained in the 7–15% range for all
cohorts. On average, rejected asylum seekers had between 172
(2009) and 323 (2007) relatively established (former) compatriots in
the Netherlands.TABLE 1 Average values (in)dependent variables by cohorta
2005
Dependent variable
AVR use in year of rejection or subsequent year 5.3%
Independent variables: non‐policy factors
Country‐cohort level
Civil unfreedom / political terror 10.1
Change in civil unfreedom / political terror ‐0.34
GDP PPP per capita $4,274
GDP growth 6.9%
Ethnic incorporation potential 301
Individual level
Age 30.5
Unaccompanied man 74.7%
Childless couple 1.9%
Unaccompanied woman 13.9%
Applicant (single or in couple) with children of non‐school age 4.2%
Applicant (single or in couple) with at least one school‐age child 5.2%
Independent variables: policy factors
Country‐cohort level
Native counselor availability 4.6%
Real value return assistance 4.5
Georgian, Macedonian or Belarussian 9.5%
Deportation rate in year of rejection or subsequent year 1.4%
Individual level
Status determination time (months) 1.6
Note. AVR = Assisted Voluntary Return; GDP PPP = Gross Domestic Product a
aAll figures are unweighted averages.Turning to the “policy” variables, deportation risk increased
sharply from 2007 onwards. In 2005, 3.9% had access to a native
counselor, increasing to 23.1% for the 2010 cohort. Macedonians,
Belarussians and Georgians suddenly represented 20.7% of all rejected
asylum seekers in 2010—without a human rights crisis occurring in
these countries—, and 39% of them returned with IOM aid before
2012 (figure not included in the table). The average time required for
the determination of status was about 6 months for most cohorts.13
The real value of reintegration assistance shows a downward trend.4.2 | Regression analyses
Table 2 present five regression models (unstandardized effects are
given in odds ratios, and XY‐standardized effects are given between
parentheses). The first model estimates cohort effects without taking
account of any other variables. It basically shows the same as Table 1:
being in the 2010 cohort is associated with almost three times higher
odds on AVR use compared with the 2005 cohort.
Model 2 adds the “non‐policy” variables. The level of political
unfreedom and terror has a negative coefficient, but is only significant
at the p = 0.1 level in Models 5 and 6. Changes in unfreedom and terror
are significant, indicating that AVR use becomes more likely when
source country political conditions have recently improved. StandardCohorts
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
4.4% 4.7% 13.1% 19.0% 18.3%
11.1 10.4 11.8 11.5 9.9
0.33 0.07 0.15 ‐0.60 ‐0.30
$4,401 $5,294 $5,033 $4,251 $4,745
7.5% 7.6% 6.9% 3.7% 4.9%
207 323 254 172 225
30.3 31.6 30.7 30.7 30.8
77.4% 70.1% 77.3% 76.9% 64.9%
1.4% 2.7% 1.5% 2.2% 3.2%
12.3% 15.8% 14.0% 12.4% 14.8%
3.1% 3.8% 3.9% 4.2% 7.1%
5.8% 7.6% 3.4% 4.3% 10.0%
41.5% 26.2% 50.9% 54.4% 23.1%
4.4 3.9 3.4 3.9 3.0
4.9% 4.3% 2.1% 3.1% 20.7%
2.8% 11.6% 17.7% 13.9% 21.2%
3.3 7.1 5.1 7.1 5.2
t purchasing power parity.
TABLE 2 Odds ratios and XY‐standardized coefficients (in parentheses). Dependent variable: AVR use in rejection year or subsequent calendar
year
Non‐deported migrants from larger
country cohorts (N > 50)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Cohort
2005 cohort (ref)
2006 cohort 0.89 (−0.02) 0.94 (−0.01) 0.89 (−0.02) 0.83 (−0.03) 0.70 (−0.06)
2007 cohort 0.93 (−0.01) 0.98 (−0.00) 0.99 (−0.00) 1.17 (0.02) 0.76 (−0.04)
2008 cohort 1.73** (0.09) 1.90** (0.10) 1.85** (0.09) 3.11** (0.16) 2.26** (0.11)
2009 cohort 2.22** (0.16) 2.18** (0.15) 2.13** (0.15) 3.54** (0.23) 2.52** (0.16)
2010 cohort 2.78** (0.19) 2.67** (0.18) 2.44** (0.16) 4.72** (0.27) 2.92** (0.18)
Non‐policy factors
Country‐cohort level
Civil unfreedom / political terror 0.96 (−0.06) 0.95 (−0.07) 0.90~ (−0.15)
Change in civil unfreedom / political terror 0.85* (−0.07) 0.85* (−0.07) 0.81* (−0.09)
Living standard (logged) 1.47** (0.17) 1.43** (0.14) 1.79** (0.23)
Change in living standard 1.00 (−0.01) 1.00 (−0.01) 1.02 (0.04)
Ethnic incorporation potential (logged) 0.80** (−0.17) 0.86** (−0.12) 0.95 (−0.03)
Individual level
Age 1.07** (0.32) 1.07** (0.31) 1.09** (0.37)
Age squared / 100 0.94** (0.21) 0.94** (−0.20) 0.92** (−0.26)
Unaccompanied man (ref)
Childless couple 0.85 (−0.01) 0.85 (−0.01) 0.69~ (−0.02)
Unaccompanied woman 0.65** (−0.07) 0.66** (−0.07) 0.60** (−0.08)
Applicant with children of non‐school age 0.69** (−0.04) 0.69** (−0.04) 0.63**(−0.04)
Applicant with at least one school‐age child 0.53** (−0.08) 0.54** (−0.07) 0.48** (−0.08)
Policy factors
Country‐cohort level
Native counselor 1.92* (0.14) 2.54** (0.19)
Real value return assistance 1.06 (0.03) 1.12 (0.05)
Macedonia / Belarus / Georgia 2.68* (0.12) 3.10 (0.12)
Macedonia / Belarus / Georgia * 2010 2.29* (0.08) 1.24 (0.02)
Deportation risk 1.03** (0.15)
Individual level
Status determination time 1.03~ (0.12) 0.99 (−0.07)
Status determination time squared /100 0.84** (−0.35) 0.92 (−0.17)
Intercept 0.04** 0.02** 0.01** 0.03** 0.00**
Level 2 variance (country‐year)a 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.47 0.25
Level 3 variance (country)a 0.98 0.70 0.64 1.18 0.84
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.04 0.15 0.22 0.09 0.26
Note. AVR = Assisted Voluntary Return.
**p < 0.01;
*p < 0.05;
~p < 0.10.
aLevel 1 variance is fixed at 3.29.
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increases by 1 (roughly the difference between Angola and Lebanon
or Ethiopia and Iraq), the odds of AVR use increase by 1.47. Changes
in living standard are not significant. Unaccompanied men are more
likely to use AVR than couples, unaccompanied women, and those
with children, especially with school‐age children. There is a curvilinear
relationship between age and AVR use: with other factors held con-
stant, it peaks around the age of 60.The inclusion of these “non‐policy” variables leads to smaller dif-
ferences between the cohorts: the standardized coefficient for being
in the 2010 cohort decreases from 0.192 to 0.181, a decrease of 6%.
Further analyses (not shown) indicate that the coefficients primarily
change due to the GDP per capita variable.
The third model adds all “policy” variables, except deportation risk.
Net of other factors, native counselor availability almost doubles the
odds of AVR use (p < 0.05). The coefficient of the real value of
8 LEERKES ET AL.reintegration assistance is positive, but not significant.14 With other
factors held constant, Georgians, Macedonians, or Belarussians had
almost three times higher odds of AVR use, especially when rejected
in 2010 (the interaction with the 2010 dummy is significant). As
expected, status determination time shows a curvilinear relationship
with AVR use: it first becomes more likely the longer it takes for status
to be determined, peaking at an “optimum” of about 7 months, after
which it becomes less likely.
Due to the inclusion of the “policy variables”, the coefficients of
the cohort dummies decrease further. The standardized coefficient
for being in the 2010 cohort decreases by 10%, from 0.181 to 0.163.
Further analyses (not shown) indicate that the coefficients mostly
change because of increased native counselor availability and the
increase in Macedonians, Belarussians and Georgians.
Models 4 and 5 pertain to individuals from cohorts consisting of at
least 50 persons who were not deported in the rejection year or the
subsequent year. Model 4 only includes the cohort dummies; model
5 includes all variables. The patterns are comparable with the previous
models, but ethnic incorporation potential and status determination
time are no longer significant. Deportation risk has a significant posi-
tive effect on AVR use: a 10% increase in deportation risk increases
the odds of AVR use by about one third (exp(10 * ln(1.031)) = 1.36).
The standardized coefficient for the 2010 dummy diminishes from
0.27 to 0.18 (34%), indicating that among larger cohorts, about a third
of the increase in AVR has been explained. Similar results were found
when 25 or 75 was taken as the minimum country‐cohort size
(selecting larger country‐cohorts increasingly leads to a loss of
statistical power, as few cases remain).5 | CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
There has been a marked increase in AVR in the Netherlands, and this
paper analyses its causes, paying attention to both “non‐policy” and
“policy” factors. Part of the increase is found to be related to three
policy factors: increased “native counselor” availability, heightened
deportation risks, and increased financial reintegration support. The
evidence for the third factor is indirect and its effects also occurred
in unintended ways, as reintegration support actually began to attract
migrants from poorer European countries who returned in relatively
high numbers using IOM aid. Part of the increase is associated with
non‐policy factors: on average, the more recent cohorts originated
from somewhat more prosperous source countries than the older
cohorts. About two thirds of the increase remains unexplained. Given
its timing, and other factors being accounted for, we suspect a relation-
ship with the DT&V case workers being systematically assigned to
rejected asylum seekers after 2007.
This study is the first to quantitatively test assumed AVR determi-
nants and generalizability of known determinants of return migration
among labor, family, and asylum permit holders. Various assumed
determinants, including those not explaining the AVR increase, were
corroborated. First, source country political conditions do not only
matter during admission decisions, but also influence the return deci-
sions among those who are not considered to be in need of protection.
Second, such decisions are driven by economic considerations, withreturn to unprosperous countries being relatively uncommon. Third,
social attachments matter: age of migration—indicating source country
attachments—has a curvilinear effect on AVR, with rates peaking
around the age of 60; families, especially those with school‐age
children, are relatively unlikely to return. Opportunities for ethnic
incorporation diminish return migration.
In the remainder of the article, we go into the study’s broader
implications for the (1) debate on terminology and (2) the study of pol-
icy effects in migration studies.
(1) Return migration has different meanings to different migrants.
However, rather than “voluntary” and “forced” return being a simple
dichotomy, practices of return lie on a continuum, from relatively vol-
untary to relatively forced, and we usually observe complex blends of
(in)voluntariness. Even relatively privileged migrants conducting return
visits as part of a “voluntary” transnational lifestyle (Erdal, Amjad,
Bodla, & Rubab, 2016), may partially be pressured into transnational
living by the challenges of integration (Snel, ‘t Hart, & Van Bochove,
2016). At the other end of the continuum, in case of “forced return”,
we still find immigration detainees consenting to their deportation,
while others successfully use their agency to resist it (Hasselberg,
2014; Lietaert, Broekaert, & Derluyn, 2015; Leerkes & Kox, 2016).
The mere lack of force is insufficient to frame AVR as being on the
“voluntary” side of this spectrum. On the one hand, our analysis does
indicate some voluntariness in the sense that those who are known
to be relatively likely to return—such as citizens from more prosperous
countries who have relatively strong source country attachments—are
overrepresented among the IOM’s clients. Furthermore, the return is
partly the result of “softer” forms of power, such as perceived legiti-
macy, which leave people some choice to comply or resist. On the
other hand, it is clear that rejected asylum seekers are typically
required to return to countries that are unattractive destinations for
return migration. It is questionable whether they would have returned
had they obtained a residence permit and had not been put at risk of
deportation. In other words, while voluntariness, facilitation, and
mechanisms contributing to the perceived legitimacy of return are
foregrounded in AVR, deterrence and force certainly operate in the
background.
One possibility to overcome legal dichotomies and do more justice
to the properties of return migration among non‐deported rejected
asylum seekers, is by seeing it as a form of “soft deportation” (or “soft
expulsion”), reserving the term (hard) “deportation” to forced removal:
this sensitizes us to the fact that such return has deportation‐like
properties, while acknowledging that it depends less on force and
deterrence, and more on perceived legitimacy and—should the return
be “assisted”—on payments. While we do not expect policymakers
and the IOM to adopt the term, one wonders why the adjective
“voluntary” in AVR isn’t simply dropped. The term “soft deportation”
is not intended to capture all AVR variants and all forms of return
involving unauthorized migrants: there may be significantly more vol-
untariness in assisted return among asylum permit holders and among
illegally staying labor migrants who choose to return after they have
successfully saved up enough capital (‘target earners”).
(2) As the Dutch state does not register unassisted departure, AVR
increases could be due to “substitution”, to the effect that those who
had in the past returned on their own increasingly began returning
LEERKES ET AL. 9with IOM. If unregistered departure was indeed relatively uncommon
—especially in the form of return rather than onward migration to a dif-
ferent European country—there will have been a real increase in
return.15 With that proviso, our findings confirm Gibney’s (2008)
argument on effective policy innovation: the AVR increases were a
by‐effect of the rising deportation rates and were driven by policy
mechanisms that are more specific to AVR, most notably the increased
use of “native counsellors” (and possibly the DT&V case workers).
States only seem to be capable or partially closing “efficacy gaps”
(Czaika & De Haas, 2013) in the return of asylum seekers. Even for
the 2010 cohort, less than 50% left the country “demonstrably” by
2012, suggesting that many individuals still preferred the curtailed life
chances as unauthorized migrants to a return to the source country
conditions that they fled. International inequality—both in living
standard, safety and freedom—clearly acts as a powerful counterforce,
limiting the efficacy of deportation regimes. Ethnic incorporation
opportunities similarly generate a kind of “cumulative causation”
(Massey, 1990) effect in asylum migration that is difficult for states
to control.
The attention being paid to policy gaps in migration studies should
not divert scholarly attention away from what laws and policies do
achieve, and how this occurs, that is, not only via “visible” policy mech-
anisms (force, facilitation, and highly visible forms of deterrence), but
also via more “invisible” mechanisms, including forms of deterrence
resulting from the exclusion of unauthorized migrants from labor mar-
kets and social provisions, and, especially, perceived legitimacy. While
the legitimacy of today’s immigration regimes is far from uncontested
(also see Ryo, 2013), we suspect that perceived legitimacy still limits
international migration considerably, if only because political borders
are likely to have the effect of international migration being perceived
as less “natural” and “allowed” than domestic migration. A direction for
future research on policy effects would be to better understand such
mechanisms, and to examine whether cultural developments under
the influence of globalization, including the possible rise of an aspired
“global citizenship” in countries outside of the Global North, attenuate
such normative influences on migration patterns.
ENDNOTES
1 The amnesty involved asylum seekers registered before April 2001, and
resulted in about 30,000 residence permits. The asylum applications of
about 100,000 persons (aged 12 years or older) who applied between
January 1995 and April 2001 were rejected (De Boom, Engbersen, &
Leerkes, 2006). Assuming that about 20% of them left through AVR
or deportation, about 0.80 * 100,000 = 80,000 persons remained
who, on average, had 9 years to leave the country after the rejection
of their asylum claim until the Amnesty. If 30,000 were in the country
in 2007, then 50,000 must have left, suggesting an average annual
departure rate of 6.9% (50,000/80,000/9 * 100%). Indeed, in a sample
of 108 nearly rejected asylum seekers no more than 8% scored higher
than 4 on a 1 to 7 Likert scale measuring intention to return in the next
12 months, including non‐assisted return, and no less than 78% scored a
1 (Leerkes, Galloway & Kromhout, 2010).
2 Since the 1997 Dublin Convention entered into force, rejected asylum
seekers applying for asylum elsewhere in Europe can be returned to
the country of the first asylum application. Since EURODAC became
operational in 2003, they are recognized by their finger prints. Other
intergovernmental “foreigner” databases also expanded.
3 These figures pertain to individuals included in the present analyses.4 This notion of deportation is broader than in a strictly legal sense:
deportation regimes, so defined, also encompass all activities by, on
behalf of, or promoted by governments to encourage the “voluntary”
return of foreigners who become deportable should they stay. It is
narrower than De Genova’s (2010) conceptualization, who considers
‘deportability’—which also pertains to how individuals may become
defined as deportable —an important aspect of “the” deportation regime
(he only uses the term in the singular). We are hesitant to consider such
definitional aspects as elements of deportation regimes; it seems more
appropriate to regard them as belonging to countries’ admission or cit-
izenship regimes.
5 Parliamentary Papers II 2001/2002, 19637/26646, no. 609; and http://
www.iom‐nederland.nl/nl/vrijwillig‐vertrek/terugkeer‐naar‐uw‐land‐
van‐herkomst‐rean, visited July 2014.
6 In the 2005–2011 periods, 39,132 individuals received a negative first
instance decision. After deleting minors and randomly selecting one
individual in files containing several adults, 27,710 persons remained.
A total of 22,413 persons remained after selecting non‐EU nationals
with a first instance decision before 2011 (leaving out the 2011 cohort).
A total of 17,801 persons remained after removing cases with missing
values on any of the independent variables (22 died according to regis-
trations). Finally, about 2000 persons were excluded who submitted a
first asylum request before 2005, as it could not be established with
certainty for them whether the first registered decision in the 2005–
2011 period really was the first negative decision. Missing values were
partly due to a lack of information on the country‐cohort level (mostly
on GDP and/or price level), such as for Somalia and Cuba. The AVR
rates for these countries were usually relatively low and their exclusion
led to slightly higher AVR rates (11.5% on average for the 2005–2011
cohorts, instead of 9.5%).
7 For example, in 2010, Guinea held elections after a military coup (−5 on
our measure), in 2006, the Nepalese king reinstated the dissolved
House of Representatives (−2.5), in 2009, U.S. troops handed over
security duties to Iraqi forces (−1.5), and in 2006, the Tamil tigers and
the Sri Lankan government resumed fighting (+2.5).
8 Only asylum seekers with the same national origin as a native counselor
received a 1 on the dummy, even if some counselors serve larger lan-
guage regions, such as “the Maghreb”.
9 The degree of inflation in the United States compared with 2005 was
adjusted for (the 2006 rates were divided by 1.032, e.g., as the U.S.
inflation rate for 2006 was 3.2%).
10 Usually, there is more temporary migration between nearby countries.
However, due to higher transportation costs, returnees from far away
countries have a larger incentive to use AVR instead of financing the
return themselves. These mechanisms may offset each other.
11 Using the Stata collin package, we found Variance Inflaction Factor (VIF)
values to be under 3.4 in all models, except for the squared terms “age”
(VIF ≈ 22) and “status determination time” (VIF ≈ 8). (Squared terms are
highly correlated by definition). The highest correlation (r = 0.52) was
found between native counselor and political unfreedom and terror.
12 If deportees are kept in the 0‐category, the effects of deportation risk
are underestimated: the elevated number of AVR users among coun-
try‐cohorts with many deportees would be masked by an
overestimation of the number of people not leaving.
13 Average status determination time is short for the 2005 cohort, because
only persons with a first application after 2005 are included.
14 Countries with low price levels may be unattractive destinations beyond
“GDP PPP per capita” and “unfreedom and terror” values. Future
research should look into such possible “unmeasured heterogeneity”.
15 We also find increases in AVR if we limit the analysis to relatively distant
countries where migrants are more unlikely to have returned to without
assistance due to higher transportation costs.
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